ABSTRACT Thousands of vulnerabilities are discovered in programs every day, which is extremely harmful to software security. Thus, discovering vulnerabilities in projects has become a central issue. Facing a sustained growth of software complexity and large code size, manual code auditing becomes time-consuming and labor-intensive. With more open source programs available and a high degree of code formalization, it is possible to study features from source code to guide vulnerability discovery work. In this paper, we present a lightweight-assisted vulnerability discovery method using a deep neural network (LAVDNN) to detect weakness and to provide guidance for manual auditing. The method proposed in this paper leverages function names as semantics features to uncover weak functions in large-scale open source programs. First, we extract function names and classify into weak and benign datasets. Then, we construct deep neural networks and compare the performances of different models. According to the experimental results, our method performs well for both C/C++ and Python programs, with the F 2 -score reaching 0.91 and 0.915, respectively. Ultimately, we evaluate the method by comparing with other approaches using the libraries FFmpeg 0.6 and LibTIFF 4.0.6. The results show that the LAVDNN could narrow the range of functions to be analyzed and report more weak functions without any prior vulnerability information. As a lightweight-assisted tool, the LAVDNN significantly reduces the false positive rate and hardly misses weak functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of computer technology, many software vulnerabilities have been discovered, which could cause serious problems to software security. According to a recent security threat report, the Internet suffers from nearly 800 million malware attacks in Q2 2018, which reached a high record [1] . Additionally, the number of vulnerabilities reported publicly to the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures database (CVE) [2] has increased each year, from 4,500 in 2010 to 18,000 in 2017. Given the substantial risks of these security vulnerabilities and increasing code complexity, it has been already a public concern that how we effectively detect potential vulnerabilities in software.
Currently, existing methods of detecting unknown vulnerabilities in open source programs mainly rely on manual code auditing. However, with increases in software complexity and code scale, manual code auditing has become time consuming
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Feng Lin. and labor intensive. When dealing with large-scale software and high-complexity open source code, the manual auditing method suffers from low efficiency.
Given the problems of uncovering vulnerabilities by code auditing, many tools including static analysis techniques and dynamic analysis techniques have been used to detect vulnerabilities. Static analysis techniques leverage human-defined patterns to uncover vulnerabilities, which still requires manual annotations [3] . Dynamic analysis tools generally use fuzzing test and symbolic execution to detect weakness in programs. However, the runtime of these methods increases exponentially with the growth of paths in software, which restricts the usage in large scale programs.
The existing assisted detecting approaches mentioned above, however, still suffer from problems in identifying vulnerabilities. First, the current tools might miss many vulnerabilities or incur high false negative rate when facing large programs. The false positive could increase huge workload for further analysis, which reflects the detecting effectiveness and the false negative might miss many vulnerabilities, VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ which shows detecting accuracy. To discover vulnerabilities accurately and effectively, it is important for the vulnerability detection systems to achieve false negative and false positive rates as low as possible. Additionally, most detection tools find vulnerabilities based on features predefined by human experts. Due to the complexity of modern software and the large scale of program code, the extraction of useful static features according to artificial rules can be difficult and subjective [4] . Furthermore, only limited types of vulnerabilities can be detected by single tool [5] , [6] , which restricts the applicability. Thus, many vulnerability discovery tools have difficulty in working on practical programs effectively. Considering the aforementioned limitations of current methods, a broader detection tool that is not limited by weakness types is urgently needed.
A. MOTIVATION
Machine learning has been widely used in cyber security, such as threat prediction [7] , spam detection [8] , and network traffic classification [9] . With the rapid development of neural networks, deep Learning, a state-of-the-art method, has been widely used in software security recently [10] , [11] .
Deep learning has the advantages that requires no pre-defined rules by human experts, which could significantly reduce labor work in vulnerability detection. The source code of software could offer better readability for researchers. Additionally, it contains rich semantic and syntax information, such as imported header files, function calls [12] , variable types and code changes, which could prompt the process of identifying hidden flaws in software. Based on the above facts, the deep learning techniques have been widely adopted in discovering software weakness. Currently, deep neural network is extensively adopted in image identifying and natural language processing problems. To identify vulnerabilities rapidly and automatically, security researchers are seeking methods to combine deep neural networks with features of source code. Some researchers extract static features from source code and convert them to images. Thus, neural networks designed for identifying images could be applied for discovering weakness. For example, the Intel labs has designed the tool HeNet [13] to discover weakness, which transfers the control flow sequences into a series of images. In addition, the sequences of source code are contextually related, which can be regarded as text sequence. Thus, researchers leverage deep neural networks for natural language processing problems to find hidden flaws. For example, VulDeePecker [14] uses code gadgets to represent programs and leverages LSTM to discover vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we propose a lightweight assisted approach based on deep neural networks (LAVDNN) for vulnerability detection. Our method extracts operational semantics features in functions to classify vulnerable and benign functions. The operational semantics is related to functionalities, and some semantics can lead to risks of vulnerability, which is called sensitive operational semantics. The normative function names as important semantics feature of functions could briefly summarize the functionality of functions, which could be used to judge whether functions are vulnerable. For example, the ReadTIFFImage function in ImageMagick7.0.7 reads images in TIFF format, which can suffer from a read exception. Moreover, the pm_mallocarray2 function from Netpbm allocates a certain amount of space to the array, which can suffer from a heap overflow.
We implement the approach based on deep neural networks to classify weak and benign functions. We extract sensitive function names from CVE entries as vulnerable dataset and nonsensitive function names from several well-known open source programs as benign dataset. Our method leverages BLSTM to learn semantics features and research the effects of program languages on the model. Results show that LAVDNN could achieve high classification accuracy, with the F 2 -score reaching 0.91 for C/C++ programs and 0.915 for Python programs.
To evaluate the performance of our method, this paper selects practical cases FFmpeg 0.6 and LibTIFF 4.0.6 for experiments and compares LAVDNN with other proposed tools. From experimental results, we conclude that LAVDNN could discover almost all vulnerable functions reported on the CVE website while it also effectively reduces the false reported functions with a quite short running time. Within further comparison with other methods, we find LAVDNN has the ability of discovering all types of vulnerabilities and is not limited by programming languages, which means it could applicable for more open source projects.
In summary, the main contributions in this paper are listed as follows: 1) We propose LAVDNN, a lightweight approach of assisted vulnerability discovery using deep neural networks. Our method aims to assist manual code auditing and to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of uncovering vulnerabilities without complicated processing.
2) We extract operational semantics features from the source code as an important classification criterion. We use function names as important semantics features for classification, which are extracted from source code conveniently. We build the datasets containing 8,525 vulnerable functions selected from the CVE website [2] , and 8,000 benign functions from open source programs.
3) We construct a deep neural network as a classifier to distinguish functions, which deals with function names. We vectorize the input words in character-level with one-hot encoding method. In this paper, we build two types of different networks and compare the performances of them. In addition, we conduct C/C++ and Python programs in experiments to research the applicability of different programming languages for our system. 4) We present a quantitative and qualitative evaluation of LAVDNN to describe the effectiveness of the system. We propose the F 2 -score as measuring metrics, and select FFmpeg 0.6 and LibTIFF 4.0.6 as target programs to test LAVDNN. With comparison to earlier methods, the proposed system in this paper can detect as many vulnerabilities as possible without the support of already-known vulnerabilities.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related work of discovering vulnerabilities in projects is presented in Section II. The design of the assisted discovery system is introduced in Section III. The implementation of the method is explained in Section IV. A verification of the model and an evaluation with practical cases are presented in Section V. Finally, we evaluate our method and conclude the future work in Section VI and Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Static analysis techniques are used as faster and lightweight methods to discover vulnerabilities. Many static analysis approaches uncover weakness by scanning source code and compare with existing vulnerable patterns. Flawfinder [15] is a static code-checking tool that reports security issues including buffer overflow, Use-after-free, and other classic vulnerabilities. Flawfinder matches source code against the built-in vulnerability database of C/C++ functions. This method leverages text pattern matching to uncover potential weaknesses and report them based on the level of danger. Splint [16] is designed for scanning C programs thoroughly, which can check abstract violations, usage of undefined variables, and other errors. Rats [17] is a rough static analyzing tool for auditing, which could scan C, C++, PHP, and Python source code to flag weakness. However, these methods may suffer from high false positive rates when dealing with large-scale open source programs.
Dynamic analysis approaches have been proposed to detect potential vulnerabilities in projects, which include symbolic execution, dynamic taint tracking, and fuzzing test. KLEE is presented by Cadar et al. [18] as a symbolic execution tool for program analysis. KLEE may not be executed on large scale programs with the limits of discovering control paths. MACE [19] combines traditional symbolic and concrete execution to test software security, which significantly increases the code coverage and exploration depth. These approaches have the ability to diagnose weakness of programs precisely, whereas the efficiency is determined by software complexity and code scale. Furthermore, complicated manual configuration work is still necessarily required when using these methods.
Recently, a novel machine-learning approach has been widely used in many fields, and researchers have applied it to find vulnerabilities for assisting human work. In 2011, an assisted discovery of vulnerabilities tool Vulnerability Extrapolation based software API patterns was proposed in [20] . In 2016, a large-scale vulnerability discovery method was presented in [21] , which extracts static and dynamic features by machine learning method to discover vulnerabilities. In 2018, VulDeePecker was developed based on static features in [14] , which analyzes source code by using a code gadget with neural networks to detect software weakness. In addition, Security and Privacy Lab of Intel proposed a deep learning method using control flow trace during program execution to discovery kinds of vulnerabilities [13] .
As a lightweight tool, the method proposed in the paper aims to improve effectiveness and accuracy of vulnerability discovery. Compared with traditional static discovery tool, our method could deal with many kinds of programming language rapidly and reduce false report. Compared with other machine-learning based approaches, LAVDNN requires less features from source code and detects weakness more rapidly, which improves effectiveness of the vulnerability discovery.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our method of using operational semantics features to classify benign and weak functions. Furthermore, this section introduces the system design of LAVDNN. Specific functionalities may have the risk of vulnerability. When auditing the source code manually, researchers usually focus on dangerous functionalities or suspicious code implementations according to artificial experience. For example, when functions strcpy and memcpy are called, developers should pay more attention to these functions since they have a high probability of being vulnerable. Although the mechanism of vulnerabilities can be quite complex, which needs human analysis and repeated debugging, some dangerous functions undoubtedly increase the weak risks. Therefore, semantics features could be used to represent the functionality and determine whether functions are vulnerable.
As the most intuitive and important semantics features, function names can be used as an important criterion for classifying weak and benign functions. Function names can briefly summarize the functionality and researchers could obtain the content of function according to the name, then making a preliminary judgment on the security. To better illustrate the relevance between function names and vulnerabilities, we list some vulnerable function names and benign function names in Table. 1.
Extracting function names to identify weak functions could bring two advantages. First of all, the semantics information in source code has been fully used for judging whether the vulnerability exists. Since sensitive functional operations are often accompanied by vulnerabilities, this judgment is intuitive and reliable. Secondly, extracting function names from the source code can eliminate complex preprocessing steps compared with other human-defined features such as code gadgets and control flow graph [22] . Therefore, this method could rapidly detect vulnerable functions and greatly improve developer productivity. Remarkably, this method diagnoses software vulnerabilities at function granularity.
The difficulty of using function names as judgment criteria for function security is that naming functions is quite subjective. As a result of no existing rules for function names, it is difficult to handle these names with traditional methods. For example, when a function reads content from buffer, it is easy to trigger a read exception. The names of these functions within read exceptions are changeful, and some of them are listed in Table. 2. As can be seen, function names vary from different programs though they implement the same operation. Traditional algorithms such as fuzzy matching cannot comprehensively summarize the rules of function names. Based on considerations above, this paper uses deep neural networks to deal with them. Since function names can convey semantics information, we construct appropriate neural networks to handle this problem, which is similar to natural language processing (NLP) problem.
B. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
In this paper, we aim to design a lightweight assisted vulnerability detection tool for analyzing source code. We first obtain semantics features from open source programs and extract function names. Secondly, we vectorize the function names to proper representation for neural networks. Then we use trained model to predict the probabilities of functions. The system can quickly classify all functions without complex manual labor. As an assisted vulnerability discovery tool, it reduces the analysis work and greatly improves the efficiency of code auditing.
The entire system is divided into two phases, a learning phase and a detecting phase. In learning phase, we select tagged functions as datasets to train the neural networks and verify the learning performance. In detection phase, we extract operational semantics from target programs and predict the vulnerable probability of functions using trained neural networks. To make our system available to researchers, the model and datasets have been released on Github.
(https://github.com/StablelJay/LAVDNN)
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we illustrate our method of using a deep neural network to uncover vulnerable functions thoroughly, including building datasets, vectorization, and constructing a neural network. Complicated manual work and comprehensive analysis are needed to achieve the goal of lightweight assisted vulnerability discovery.
A. DATASETS
To build datasets for training, the key is to extract proper function names that represent functionality. Bad-named functions in datasets can bring confusion and lead to a failure of classification. The fact is that function names in most commercial software and many widely used programs are developed normatively, which have a one-to-one correspondence with the functionality. In other words, the wider the usage of an open source program, the greater the standardization of function names, which means that function names could represent function operations.
It is important to obtain function names that can exactly represent the functionalities. Therefore, all data that we selected in our experiments comes from formal open source programs, which pays more attention to code readability and norms during development. These programs may have complex call relationships among functions, but single function is not complicated, and the function names can represent functional operation behaviors.
1) EXTRACTION OF SENSITIVE FUNCTIONS
To extract sensitive function names from weak functions, this paper focuses on vulnerabilities reported in the CVE official website [2] , where detailed information of each vulnerability, including types, trigger location, and even related source code, is published. Since the operational semantics correspond to function names, we focus on vulnerable function names among the information. For example, Table. 3 lists CVE-2018-8960, where heap-based buffer overread occurs in the vulnerable function named ReadTIFFImage. We select vulnerable function names from CVE entries as sensitive functions datasets.
When selecting sensitive functions, we scanned all CVE entries reported from 2008 to 2018 and selected eligible function names from vulnerabilities information. We collected 8,525 vulnerable function names as sensitive dataset in total. The process of extracting function names from CVE entries requires a large manual workload. It is worth mentioning that vulnerable functions related to LibTIFF and FFmpeg are selected separately, which are not included in the training dataset.
2) EXTRACTION OF NONSENSITIVE FUNCTIONS
The extraction of nonsensitive semantics feature requires further work. For certain functions, even if no vulnerabilities have been found or published, the operations still suffer the danger of being vulnerable, and these functions are remarked as suspected vulnerable functions. For example, functions related to writing content to the buffer are easily to trigger buffer overflow, which are regarded as suspected vulnerable functions, even if most of them are benign. To ensure the best effects of classification, the extraction of nonsensitive operational semantics should strictly avoid both vulnerable functions and suspected vulnerable functions.
When selecting nonsensitive functions, we scanned widely used open source programs, including QEMU [23] , ImageMagick [24] , multidiff [25] , lrzip [26] , KLEE [27] , and vim [28] , to extract function names. Then, we filter out vulnerable and suspected vulnerable functions. This step takes a considerable amount of manual work, and 8,000 benign function names are selected to be nonsensitive dataset eventually.
To research the applicability of LAVDNN on different programming languages, this paper selects functions developed in C/C++ and Python. C/C++ and Python are two kinds of most commonly used programming languages, and function names written in Python are slightly different from those written in C/C++. Therefore, we collect two types of functions separately to observe the training effects. Additionally, in the real-world programs, the amount of benign functions is far more than that of vulnerable functions, which may result in missing report of vulnerable functions. In order to identify the weak functions from a large number of benign functions and improve the classification ability of our tool, the number of two kinds of functions in datasets is approximately equal. We also use F β -score to evaluate the system rather than accuracy in Section V-B to avoid this problem.
In our experiment, we selected total 8,525 weak functions from CVE website [2] , and 8,000 benign vulnerabilities from open source programs. The number of each dataset is listed in Table. 4.
B. VECTORIZATION
Operational semantics extracted from functions cannot be used in neural networks directly, which need to be vectorized. To do so, commonly used techniques in natural language processing are word2vec [29] , Skip-Gram [30] , and CBOW [31] . These methods are suitable for dealing with continuous text, which means that the contextual semantics are closely related. However, function names extracted from a program have no necessary connections and are relatively independent from each other, making them unsuitable for a continuous vectorization method. Hence, we consider vectorization techniques based on one-hot encoding [32] .
In this paper, the one-hot encoding method is used to vectorize the input into a character-level representation. In most VOLUME 7, 2019 instances, the one-hot encoding method works on the wordlevel, and the dimensions of the encoded vector depend on the number of datasets (also called word bags) to be processed. However, the number of datasets to be processed in this paper is so large that the feature space, after directly applying one-hot encoding, may also be very large. Hence, we consider using one-hot to vectorize single character instead of directly encoding words.
To introduce this vectorization method, firstly we define a character set with length N , which is also the dimension of the one-hot encoding vector. The characters used to represent function names are limited, with uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and some common characters included. Thus, N is not very large and is 66 in this paper. Each character in the set can be represented as a vector of size N * 1 of 0's and 1's.
To represent the function name with the length L, every character in words could be represented with a vector of size N * 1, and a low-density sparse matrix of size N * L combined by a one-hot encoding vector is used to represent a function name. For example, Fig.3 shows the vectorization process of the function named buf _read. The advantages of one-hot encoding could be noted from Fig.3 . Each character is encoded into a N * 1 vector, which ensures that every character is orthogonal to each other without any interference. Meanwhile, the matrix formed by character vector is as sparse as possible, so that the distance calculation among features becomes more reasonable, which is beneficial to the classification effects. 
C. NEURAL NETWORK MODEL
In the learning phase, this paper uses deep neural networks to classify functions. Although neural networks are currently used in image recognition [33] and NLP problems [34] widely, there is still no ready-fit network model for vulnerability detection.
Many kinds of neural networks have been considered to process function names. Currently, researchers usually adopt perceptron networks, conventional neural networks (CNNs) and recurrent neural networks (RNNs) as basic model. The perceptron networks, represented by MLP, need more training parameters to achieve high-quality fitting. As the length of input sequences increases, the size of training parameters grows sharply, which makes them inappropriate to deal with long input sequences. Conventional neural networks (CNNs) have a high accuracy in image classification problems [35] , [36] . Text-CNN is a deep learning algorithm developed from the traditional CNN, which is suitable for long text sequences classification. Since the convolutional operation is implemented in CNNs, the complete sentence is needed as one basic input unit rather than a single word. Thus, it has limitations in dealing with words such as function names.
Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) are good at dealing with long sequence problems [37] , [38] . Current research has implicated that when the length of the input sequence is too large, the recurrent neural networks suffer from the vanishing gradient problem [39] , which could cause ineffective and even failed training. Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [40] network and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [41] network are designed to solve this problem. LSTM introduces memory cells and forgetting gates based on the RNNs, making the LSTM performs better when processing sequence data. The GRU unit has simpler structure with only two gates, update gate and reset gate. Thus, less computational is required compared with LSTM. It is difficult to decide whether LSTM or GRU is better in NLP problem, which is generally depends on specific task and training datasets. In this paper, function names are treated as input of network with no more than 50 characters in length. When dealing with data not very long, GRU coverages rapidly but is easy to suffer from overfitting problem. Moreover, the adjustment process of parameters is tricky for GRU. Thus, we prefer LSTM as basic model.
In practical programming, function naming is a subjective task that some function names could be inverted. For example, read_buf and buf _read from different programs could represent the same functional operation. Based on this, the neural networks should be able to deal with input sequences forward and reversely. To improve the learning performance and classification accuracy, we use Bidirectional Long short-term memory (BLSTM), which can learn input information Bidirectionally.
Based on the above analysis, this paper selects BLSTM with multiple layers as our basic model. The basic structure of BLSTM is shown in Fig.4 . The model contains a Dense layer, an output layer and multiple BLSTM layers. The input of the BLSTM is in a vector representation of function name from the datasets. For every BLSTM layer, the input information has been processed both in the forward and backward directions compared with in the LSTM. The dense layer reduces the dimensions of each vector and sends the output value to the classifier. The output layer is activated by a softmax or sigmoid function, which collects the vector from the dense layer and outputs the probability of classification.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section evaluates the performance of LAVDNN. We introduce F 2 -score to measure the model. Additionally, we describe the method of adjusting datasets and discuss the impacts of different training parameters. To test our method, we select the open source library FFmpeg 0.6 [42] and LibTIFF 4.0.6 [43] as target programs to detect possible vulnerabilities, and compare our experimental results with former tools.
A. DEVELOP ENVIRONMENT
The hardware and software environments in the experiments are as follows: we use the instance with GEFORCE 750Ti, and the experimental environment is Windows 10, with 4 CPUs and 8G memory. In the experiment, we construct the neural network with keras [44] , which uses the CNTK [45] toolkit as the backend.
B. MEASURING METRICS 1) F 2 -score
This part discusses different measuring metrics of training performance. In general, the effect of model validation is measured by accuracy (ACC), i.e., Acc = N true N total (1) where N true represents the number of correctly predicted functions, and N total represents the total number of test functions in the datasets. However, Acc can only reflect the accuracy of the model in general, and it cannot show the performance of the model in detail. Thus, we consider two factors to describe the performance more comprehensively, the false positive rate and the recall rate. The false positive rate (FPR) refers to the ratio of the number of vulnerable functions that are determined to be vulnerable functions to the proportion of all non-vulnerabilities, that is,
where FP is the number of benign functions that were misjudged as vulnerable, and TN refers to the correct number of non-vulnerabilities. The recall rate (TPR) of the model refers to the ratio of the number of vulnerable functions correctly determined to be vulnerable to all vulnerable functions, which is defined as
For a more comprehensive consideration of the impacts of FPR and TPR on the model, we use the F 1 -score [46] to measure the model, that is,
The F 1 -score takes both false positives and false negatives into account. However, precision and recall are normally contradictory, as high precision detecting systems tend to suffer in low recall. In the vulnerability detecting systems, it is first necessary to detect as many vulnerabilities as possible. When analyzing the source code, the false reporting may increase the workload, but failing to identify a vulnerability function is costly and unacceptable. Based on this, we believe that recall should be more concerned than precision. To reflect this, we improve the F 1 -score and introduce the F β -score to measure the performance of the model.
F β -score reflects different importance of recall and precision in practical situation, and in this paper, we assume β = 2 in (5), that is F 2 -score to measure the whole system. VOLUME 7, 2019
2) JUDGING PRINCIPLE
The classification based on the output probability is a problem worthy of attention. In general, the classification of the function is judged according to the maximum predicted probability. However, in practical problems, situations can be complicated, and the judging principle may be different since the cost of misclassification is different in practice. In the problem of this paper, to minimize missing report of vulnerability functions, we consider the following three judging principles:
Assuming that P 1 ={ Probability of being judged as a weak function }, P 2 ={ Probability of being judged as a benign function }, we have 1) Principle 1: Function is determined as vulnerable if P 1 ≥ P 2 and benign if P 1 < P 2 . 2) Principle 2: Function is determined as vulnerable if P 1 ≥ α and benign if P 1 < α. 3) Principle 3: Function is determined as benign if P 2 ≥ α and vulnerable if P 2 < α. Among three principles mentioned above, to research the most proper one for the vulnerability discovery problem, we use the training method in Section V-C and calculate the F 2 -score with each principle. We set the threshold as α, where α ∈ (0, 1). To optimize the judging principle, we consider the impact of threshold to accuracy and plot F 2 -score with different α's in Fig.5 . From Fig.5 , we could draw the conclusion that using principle 3 with α of 0.55 is more suitable for this problem compared with other two principles, within F 2 -score reaching 0.91. 
C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
This section aims to obtain the best classification effects by comparing different experimental details. The training accuracy of neural networks mainly relies on three aspects: training datasets, training parameters and network construction methods. In this part, we carry on experiments from these three aspects to achieve the high classification accuracy of functions.
1) NOISE DATA
To improve classification performance and avoid overfitting problem, adding noise data to the training datasets is an effective method. Additionally, noise data could expand the size of datasets, as it is time consuming and difficult to collect sufficient training data. Gaussian random noise is commonly used in neural network training. In this paper, we use randomly generated strings with infinite length, such as caisjuo 1 jfhskjhk2, as Gaussian noise data. These random strings represent no real meaning and carry no semantics information.
During the learning phase, we found that the impacts of noise data on classification performance is complicated. Although the noise data can increase the discrimination between two kinds of datasets, excessive noise data may overwhelm the original benign functions, which may affect the training results. To research the effects of noise data on our model, we add different numbers of noise data to the original dataset and observe the classification performance separately. The results are shown in Fig.6 . Fig.6 , the conclusion could be drawn that noise data can improve classification effects. When adding 1200 noise data to the dataset, the model achieves the best classification performance, with a F 2 -score exceeding 0.9. Then, if more noise data is added, the classification effect of the model decreases. This implies that importing an appropriate amount of noise data to dataset is beneficial to improve the classification effect, and both the Python and C/C++ datasets behave best with 1200 noise data. Thus, the original datasets described in Section IV-A have been adjusted for training, which are shown in TABLE.6. 
2) NETWORK CONSTRUCTION
The design of constructing neural networks could affect the learning performance significantly. The construction of neural networks mainly involves three parts, which are activation functions, specific structure of network, and loss functions of output layers. As for loss function, the binary_crossentropy has been proved to be an accurate and effective function, which is usually adopted to binary classification problems. The neural network is combined by an input layer, several hidden layers and an output layer. The hidden layers consist of several BLSTM layers. And the output layer usually uses a dense layer according to practical experience, which is able to reduce the dimensions of output vectors. Hence, we determine the better performance by leveraging different input layer of network, which are LSTM layer and dense layer respectively. Two kinds of models (model A and model B), which differ in the first layer have been raised and Fig.7 shows the structures of them. We compare these two structures in terms of training performance. The activation function of the output layer could also affect the learning performance. Softmax and sigmoid are commonly used as activation functions in the classification problem. Between these functions, the sigmoid function is used to deal with binary classification problems while the softmax function can solve both binary classification and multiclassification problems. In practical situations, the softmax function is applied when there exist different classes that are mutually exclusive, that is, when the sum of probabilities of each class is 1. In this paper, we research the impacts of the sigmoid and softmax as the activation functions on the model. We combine model A and model B with different activation functions separately to observe the results through specific experiments.
To research better training performance, we use different network structures of models combined with activation functions. The results are displayed in Table. 7, which uses four metrics to measure the learning performance. For both model A and model B, using the sigmoid function as output layer activation function behaves better than using the softmax function. Above four combinations, model B with sigmoid function, which leverages LSTM layer as first layer, has the highest classification accuracy.
3) TRAINING PARAMETERS
The proper parameters are set to obtain better training results. In the experiments, the training epoch is set to 5, the training batch size is set to 64, and the dropout is set to 0.25. We use binary_crossentropy as loss function, which is mainly applied for binary classification combined with sigmoid function. Each layer of the multiple BLSTM networks is activated by the elu function. When adjusting the number of hidden nodes, we vary the hidden nodes and observe the training effect. Since an insufficient number of hidden nodes will cause a slow convergence and a low inefficiency while an excessive number of hidden nodes leads to an overfitting problem, we use different sets of hidden nodes for the BLSTM layer and the dense layer to observe training loss and accuracy. Fig.8 plots the training loss and the training accuracy varying with hidden nodes. As training rounds increase, the loss curves and the acc curves tend to be steady overall despite certain fluctuations. The reason of fluctuations relies on the usage of Adam optimizer when we construct neural networks. The Adam optimizer uses the algorithm of Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [47] for the sake of quick convergence, which randomly selects the data to calculate the fastest decline direction for gradient. Though the fluctuations brought by SGD may affect the training process, they have little effects on final accuracy fortunately.
As more hidden nodes are applied, the model converges faster. However, many more hidden nodes can result in overfitting and reduce the F 2 -score. F 2 -score for each set of hidden nodes. For model A, when the number of hidden nodes of the dense layer is set to 120 and the hidden nodes of BLSTM layer is set to 60, we found the network performed the best in classification accuracy without overfitting. For model B, 120 hidden nodes for the dense BLSTM layer and 200 hidden nodes for the dense layer behaved the best within the highest F 2 -score and the smoothest convergence process compared with the other four groups.
Since this paper considers a multilayer BLSTM network for training, we research the effects of varying number of layers, from 1 to 10. Fig.9 shows the F 2 -score with different hidden layers using two models and two datasets. Conclusion could be drawn from Fig.9 that, for both networks, the F 2 -score reaches the highest when the number of network layers is two. The network training effect decreases rapidly with excessive network layers. Therefore, the BLSTM models behave the best with two hidden layers and there is no significant difference in the performance between two types of datasets, which reveals that our method can handle programs written in either Python or C/C++.
D. CASE STUDY
In Section V-C, we have discussed the experimental results of the model. In this part, we evaluate the performance of this method on practical open source programs. This paper selects FFmpeg 0.6 [42] and LibTIFF 4.0.6 [43] as target programs to research the performances. Since both programs are open source and widely used by researchers to carry on penetration test or vulnerability experiments. Plenty of vulnerable functions in programs have been reported on the CVE website that could support our experiments. To comprehensively illustrate the performance of LAVDNN, we use three existing tools as baseline systems, which are Vulnerability Extrapolation [20] , Flawfinder [15] and a novel transfer-learning representations method with ASTs [48] . According to the experimental results, 354 functions are determined to be vulnerable by LAVDNN. In fact, according to our statistics, it has been discovered 135 vulnerable functions in FFmpeg 0.6 that are recorded in CVE entries between 2008-2018. Among these 135 vulnerable functions, LAVDNN misses the report of dirac_unpack_idwt_params and rle_unpack. These two functions have little semantics with function names, which could cause confusion to the classifier. Besides that, LAVDNN still performs well in detection with low false positive rate and Table. 9 lists certain vulnerable and benign probabilities of functions predicted by LAVDNN.
Vulnerability Extrapolation [20] is designed for auxiliary code auditing proposed by Fabian Yamaguchi et al., which takes a known CVE vulnerability function as input and discovers other similar functions according to the algorithm. In the article, Vulnerability Extrapolation tests FFmpeg 0.6 with CVE function flic_decode_frame_8BPP and find 20 potentially vulnerable functions with high similarities. Comparing LAVDNN with Vulnerability Extrapolation, we find certain limitations of Vulnerability Extrapolation tool. First, Vulnerability Extrapolation requires already-known CVE functions to discover similar functions, which is usually not feasible for unknown programs. Second, this tool can only detect vulnerabilities similar to known vulnerability patterns rather than all kinds of vulnerabilities, which restricts the versatility. In contrast, the method proposed in our paper is more applicable to most open source programs, and, as an auxiliary manual audit tool, it is not limited by any specific vulnerability mode, which means that it can discover many types of vulnerabilities.
To compare the experimental results quantitatively, we use a novel vulnerable functions discovery method with transfer-learned representations as baseline system, which has been proposed by Guanjun Lin et al. in 2018 [48] . In this paper, the authors propose a fine-grained vulnerability detection approach based on abstract syntax trees (ASTs) from open source functions. They leverage neural networks with Word2vec embeddings to learn deep AST representations. The authors use top-k precision and Function Inspection Reduction Rate as evaluation metrics to compare the performances of transfer-learned representations with traditional code metrics. The empirical results show that the transfer-learned representations could identify more vulnerable functions with high effectiveness.
In our study, we reproduce this method based on provided data and code online. Five programs, including LibTIFF, LibPNG, Pidgin, Asterisk, and VLC Media Player are used as training datasets for pre-training, and FFmpeg 0.6 is used as test project. The LSTM classifier is used to distinguish the functions and rank them in order of vulnerable probabilities. Within this method, 336 functions in FFmpeg 0.6 could be distinguished as unsafe, but 13 vulnerable functions reported on CVE are missed. The empirical results are shown in Table 11 .
The transfer-learning representation method could significantly reduce the scope of functions to be analyzed and report less dangerous functions compared with LAVDNN, making it a good-performance vulnerabilities discovery tool. However, LAVDNN focuses on trying not to miss any vulnerable functions in programs, since we have claimed that missing report is more dangerous than false report in vulnerability discovery. Thus, to achieve the goal of reporting weakness as more as possible, LAVDNN may be a more reasonable choice for researchers. Moreover, compared with transfer-learning representation method, LAVDNN spends less time in data processing phase while detecting vulnerabilities. This is also an VOLUME 7, 2019 Table. 10.
As for Flawfinder, a total number of 183 functions is reported to be vulnerable, 47 more than LAVDNN's. Also, Flawfinder misses 9 weak functions of CVE. Hence, LAVDNN has less false positive rate and misses less weak functions. As a static analysis tool, Flawfinder leverages source code text pattern matching with well-known vulnerabilities, which may cause higher missing report than LAVDNN. Additionally, Flawfinder only deals with C and C++ programs while LAVDNN is more applicable for all kinds of programing languages. As lightweight detection tools, both Flawfinder and LAVDNN could complete the vulnerability detection task with short running time.
VI. DISCUSSION
On the one hand, the advantages of the method in this paper are obvious. First, as a lightweight tool to assist vulnerability detection, LAVDNN can quickly extract semantics features from target open-source programs, which requires no-complicated preprocessing steps compared with most other neural network methods [22] , [49] , [50] . Second, according to the experimental results, we can see that the method can narrow the scope of analysis and greatly improve the efficiency of code auditing on the premise of having almost no omission of vulnerable functions (no more than 5%). In addition, the tool is highly applicable to all kinds of vulnerabilities. Since this method discovers weak functions based on semantics features rather than on specific vulnerable patterns, it can uncover different types of vulnerabilities. The applicability of LAVDNN is especially important for analyzing unknown software as many tools can only be applied to buffer overflow vulnerabilities (such as VulDeepecker) [5] , [6] , [14] . Finally, although this tool detects weakness at the source level, it is not limited by the compiled language. As seen from the experimental results, it can effectively handle both Python and C/C++ programs.
On the other hand, the proposed method has certain shortcomings. Firstly, though function names could generally represent the functionalities, they are not quite informative thus causing some false reports. According to experiments, we find that many suspected vulnerable functions are predicted as vulnerable functions, which is main cause of inaccuracy for our method. Since suspected vulnerable functions could implement similar functionalities with vulnerable functions, it is difficult for classifier to distinguish them according to function names. Secondly, the complete source code of program is necessary since this method uses function names to scan software at the source level. The limitation makes LAVDNN not suitable for detecting vulnerabilities without source code information. Thirdly, the detection granularity of the proposed method focuses on the function level, and it cannot accurately detect the location of the vulnerability in the function. Thus, further manual auditing is needed to be combined with to accurately locate vulnerabilities and to obtain more specific information.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes LAVDNN, a method using a deep neural network to quickly detect unknown vulnerabilities in open source programs, which aims to improve code auditing efficiency and to reduce analysis efforts. This method extracts the static features of function names in the target programs, and leverages BLSTM neural networks to classify functions. With this method, every function with a corresponding weak probability is predicted, and researchers can focus on those functions with a high probability of weakness for further analysis. Conclusions could be drawn from the experimental results that the system can achieve a high accuracy of correct classification with the F 2 -score greater than 0.91. By detecting the practical cases FFmpeg 0.6 and LibTIFF 4.0.6, results show that our method could effectively narrow the scope of functions and quickly detect vulnerable functions. Compared to earlier method Vulnerability Extrapolation [20] , LAVDNN requires no vulnerability information, which enables to detect multiple types of vulnerabilities. Compared to Flawfinder [15] and Transfer-learning representation method with ASTs [48] , LAVDNN could effectively reduce false positive rate while ensure missing reports as low as possible.
In short, as a method to assist in vulnerability detection, LAVDNN can detect potential weakness without a complex preprocessing and reduce much human labor. Though it cannot diagnose detailed vulnerable information, this method greatly reduces the heavy workload of human analysis by sorting functions according to weak probability, which enables developers to identify threats faster and improve labor efficiency. More importantly, the method is capable of detecting multiple types of vulnerabilities without limits of specific vulnerabilities.
Future work will mainly improve the deficiencies proposed in Chapter VI. First, to further refine the detection granularity and improve accuracy, we decide to automatically extract specific code fragments from source code, with control flow graphs included. Moreover, considering the difficulty in obtaining source code programs [51] , which restricts the usage of LAVDNN, we decide to extract features from intermediate representation (IR) code to detect vulnerabilities. The IR code contains rich semantic information compared with execution trace or assembly language, and more features could be extracted for weakness discovery. The IR code could be used to represent both source code programs and binary files, which expands the scope of vulnerability discovery methods on binary files.
